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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce and explain the conceptual role played by
the de Finetti’s representation theorem (henceforth dFRT) in the modern theory of
statistical inference. dFRT had a strange destiny. Published first by Bruno de
Finetti (Innsbruck, 1906 - Roma, 1985) in an paper in French language, it was re-
discovered years later after translation into English [1]. It has been recognized
as a fundamental result for Bayesian Statistics and interpreted as a kind of jus-
tification for the subjective interpretation of probability. For many reasons dFRT
does not find a place in undergraduate Statistics textbooks. First, undergraduate
Statistics is mainly frequentist with Bayesian methods relegated (if lucky) in one
final chapter close to the appendix. Second, dFRT involves some mathematical
technicalities that are not easily accessible to undergraduates. Third, and perhaps
most important, dFRT has a conceptual relevance rather than practical one and
this makes it usually more compelling for philosophers than for statisticians. It
has to be properly interpreted, i.e. to assign it a meaning, that properly locates
it conceptually inside the theoretical framework of modern inferential statistics.
The usual interpretation of dFRT stressed its role both as a formal justification of
the “degrees of belief” school of Probability theory and as a link between the latter
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and the Frequentist School [13]. Due to its borderline and foundational role, dFRT
has been approached with deference and awe in some technical presentation. On
the other hand, the scope and power of this theorem is usually under-represented
in popular Statistics expositions or introductory textbooks. In what follows I will
re-explore and clarify the meaning of the dFRT, stressing its pivotal role in par-
ticular in the induction process that was also the crux and motivation behind de
Finetti efforts concentrated in its theorem [1].
1.1 Independence and prediction: some clarifications
In life there are no difficult things to understand, everything depends on the path
we follow on the way to reach the truth and clarify the terms used. For a full
understanding of dFRT its important to review some basics facts about inferential
statistics [3, 4, 5]. In what follows I will use the term induction as a synonymous
of to be able to probabilistically infer about future outcomes looking at the past relative
frequencies. At the outset some important clarification are in order. The bad thing
of Statistics is that sometimes topics are presented in a way that mathematical
formalism covers the concept behind them so that sometimes the main point is
not easy to be grasped by the novice. The good thing is that in Mathematical
Statistics we can explain a lot of things with the use of a very common and simple
object: the coin. Nonetheless its simplicity and ubiquity, the coin tossing model
has some important disadvantages and can lead to serious misunderstandings.
The limitation is that when we consider a (even not fair) coin, we are adopting
an underlying independent and identically distributed assumption (IID henceforth)
that is quite strong and makes life very easy for the inferential exercise. But this
does not represent the whole story. What if, for whatever reason, the tossing are
not independent? What if they are not identically distributed1? Will we be able
in these condition for example to predict the next toss given the past results?
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (1)
Is induction possible in this case? Here is where the dFRT shows all its power
since it clarify at least conceptually what we can and what we cannot do and
know about induction in the the dangerous lands outside the safe IID enclosure.
An important clarification has to be stated at the outset:
1This is not an exotic possibility even in a simple coin tossing experiment. With some practice,
after many tosses, a person can become able to affect the outcome for example introducing a
bias in favor of head. The probability of getting head can thus change during the experiment,
invalidating the IID assumption.
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Warning n. 1! Independence alone in general is not enough for induction,
since
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) = p(xn+1) (2)
so this prevents the possibility to learn from the past. But if other than
independent our random variables are also identically distributed, the IID
case, then we can learn from the past using the relative frequency of the
occurrence of the event of interest. This fact is usually given for granted
in a first year undergraduate statistics course. As I swill show below, the
theoretical rationale behind this is another core result springing from the
dFRT.
2 inferential statistics: a bird’s eye view
The usual “statistical inference” tale follows some traditional steps: a) we are in-
terested in a natural phenomenon that can be properly described by a given ran-
dom variable; b) it follows that the outcome of a possible experiment regarding
the phenomenon can be described by an appropriate statistical model; c) a para-
metric statistical modelM is defined in terms of the parametric family of densities
that depend on one or more parameters θi; d) we observe data {x1, . . . , xn} as a
particular realization of the random sample {X1, . . . , Xn}; e) we use the sample
to infer the value of the parameter(s); f) we use the fully specified model for pre-
diction of future realization of the event of interest. The exact way this recipe is
put into practice depends on the paradigm adopted. We know that in life matters
rarely can be separated strictly in black and white, there is always a fuzzy shade
of gray. This is also true for this long standing debate about the conflict Frequen-
tist versus Bayesian. By and large the main line of fracture lies in the way each
group interpret probability statements and how this is reflected in the approach
to statistical inference. Here a brief sketch of the two main schools of thought.
2.1 Frequentist approach
In this approach, probability is the long-run frequency of occurrence of an event
and parameters in the statistical models are considered fixed but unknown quan-
tities. In any statistical problem, we have data that are generally sampled from
some population or data generating process that is repeatable. Probability state-
ments cannot be made about parameters because they cannot meaningfully be
considered as repeatable. The main assumption used here is that observation are
independent and identically distributed (IID) because when this is the case the sta-
tistical model of the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) can be simplified tremen-
dously by factorization:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
i
p(xi, θ). (3)
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Notice that in the formula above I put a comma between the sample value xi and
the parameter θ because for the frequentist a parameter is indeed just a parameter:
a constant whose value is unknown. Any assumption about the term p(x1, . . . , xn)
appearing in (3), the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn), is one of the fundamental
starting points of the inferential process and at the same time the entry point for
a full understanding of dFRT.
2.2 Bayesian approach
For the Bayesian parameters are not just parameters in the above sense but ran-
dom variables, something that in the mind of the researcher can assume different
values with different probabilities attached to them. As any random variable,
the parameter θ is specified by a distribution or a density called prior pi(θ) that
is based on the state of knowledge that the subject interested in the random ex-
periment possesses about the parameters; it is here that the concept of degree of
belief enters into the picture: the prior is a (not necessarily subjective) idea about
the possible values of the parameter that can be different for different subject ac-
cording to the different knowledge that they possess about the data-generating
mechanism of event of interest. pi(θ) is the terrible probability of a probability, a
concept that Frequentists simply abhor. It is not important from where the prior
come from, what is important for the Bayesian framework is how we “update”
our knowledge by combining the prior and the information collected by a ran-
dom experiment in the form of a set of data. This is given formally by the famous
Bayes formula:
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)
p(x1, . . . xn)
=
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)∫ 1
0
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ
. (4)
The denominator of the previous formula is the again the joint distribution of
(X1, . . . , Xn). Here p(x1, . . . xn) is called marginal distribution because it does not
depend on the parameter since it has been marginalized out by integration:
p(x1, . . . xn) =
∫ 1
0
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ. (5)
This equality can be easily derived by assuming that
∫ 1
0
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = 1, a fact
that makes sense only in the head of Bayesians since θ is a random variable. the
term p(x1, . . . xn|θ) appearing on the right side of (4) is the so called Likelihood
function, another hotshot of the whole inferential statistics narrative. Furthermore,
even Bayesians adopt a concept of independence to simplify the joint distribution
of (X1, . . . , Xn) but now this assumes the following form of conditional indepen-
dence:
p(x1, . . . , xn|θ) =
∏
i
p(xi|θ). (6)
In this case we have to put a bar | in the above formula to stress thanwe are condi-
tioning given the value of the random variable Θ = θ. There is a huge conceptual
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gap between formula (6) and formula (3) reflecting the fracture that opposes Fre-
quentist and Bayesian in the way they look at the inferential process.
Something at this point must be clear to the reader. Inference for the Fre-
quentist means to find an approximate value of the (unknown) constant θ using
the collected sample (x1, . . . , xn) at hand. Inference for the Bayesian means to
improve his initial knowledge about the distribution of the parameter. Both will use
their findings about θ to use the statistical model for prediction of future events.
This will be a recurrent theme if what follows. The issue of trying to predict the
future using the past information is a crux for both Frequentists and Bayesian and
will be stressed again below since is a key ingredient in the elucidation of dFRT.
Inferences about the parameter θ uses (4). What we need is to specify the prior
and this of course is a subjective ingredient. For the Bernoulli case, the Bayesian
machinery uses the Beta distribution:
pi(θ) = Beta(θ, a, b) =
Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
θa−1(1− θ)b−1, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (7)
This combined with the likelihood function generate the posterior according
to Bayes rule (4). Different choice of the parameters a and bwill generate different
classes of priors. In figure (1) the initial prior (green line) is the uniform density
generated with the choice a = 1 and b = 1. The black curve refers to the density
of a the Beta(47,55), representing the posterior in the case of fair coin tossing.
3 To the de Finetti’s representation theorem
The starting point to the dFRT is different and lies in the more general concept
of exchangeability instead of independence. Informally this means that given the
set of sampled observations {xi}i=1...n, the order of these observations does not
matter. This applies in the case of usual understanding of multiple tosses of a
Figure 1: From a uniform prior (horizontal line) and after 100 tosses of a fair coin
where #H ∼ #T . The resulting posterior is a Beta.
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coin. The “coin tossing\number of heads” experiment is modeled via the random
variable:
X(E) =
{
1 E = {Head}
0 E = {Tail} (8)
The observed list of outcomes, for example {0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0} are expected to be
exchangeable since the probability of this sequence does not change if we change
the order of digits. What seems relevant here is not the order but the numbers of 1’s.
Exchangeability expresses a kind symmetry of beliefs about the random quanti-
ties in which the future observation are expected to be similar to past observation
[16, 12, 2, 8]. The next, is a very important:
Warning n. 2! The condition of exchangeability is weaker than indepen-
dence but it is stronger than the identically distributed property. It can
be easily proven that IID random variables are exchangeable.
There are many situations in which this assumption is reasonable like in the coin
tossing experiment, and others where is not true or questionable. Consider the
following example. A football player who is practicing to score in a penalty: The
sequence scored penalties FAIL, FAIL, FAIL,GOAL,GOAL has presumably a
higher probability than GOAL,GOAL,FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, because the player
accuracy improves with practice so we can expect the future will be different
from the past. For the mathematician taste, here I give a more formal definition
of exchangeability:
Definition. A set of random variable {Xn} is said to be exchangeable if, given the
joint density p(x1, . . . , xn), we have
p(x1, . . . , xn) = p(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) (9)
for all permutations σ of 1, ..., n.
If, like in the example of the IID coin toss, we are in presence of exchangeabil-
ity, this has important conceptual consequences in terms of predictive inference.
Being exchangeable means that the past is similar to the future and this symme-
try can be translated saying that knowing the past is telling us something about
the future and helps to predict the future. As already mentioned, this is strictly
related to the problem of predictive inference, that is to estimate:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (10)
Equipped with the concept of an exchangeable sequence we can now state the
dFRT for Bernoulli distributed random variables. Various forms of extension and
generalization of exchangeability and de Finetti result can be found in literature.
The interested reader can refer to [6, 7, 10].
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Theorem (De Finetti, 1930). let {Xi}∞i=1 be a sequence of finitely exchangeable
random variables i.e. ∀n > 0 each finite sub-sequence {Xi}ni=1 is exchangeable.
Then there exists a random variable Θ and a distribution function F (θ) such
that:
p
(
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ
)
= 1 with Θ ∼ F (θ) (11)
and
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
dF (θ) (12)
A detailed proof can be found in Chapter 4 of [3] or in [9]. Here I will try tomo-
tivate the relevance of dFRTwith some examples. First let me clarify some points.
As previously mentioned, the main ingredient of inferential statistics is given by
the hypotheses over the structure joint probability distribution p(x1, . . . , xn). The
dFRT tells us that under exchangeability (not necessarily IID) the correct form of
this joint probability is given by (12). F (θ) in (11) is sometimes referred to as the
mixing distribution of the exchangeable random variable. dF (θ) can be thought of
as equivalent to pi(θ)dθ (in the sense of the Stieltjes integral) when F (θ) is contin-
uous ([15] chapter 10 p 524). This said, (12) becomes:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
pi(θ)dθ (13)
where pi(θ) is what is usually interpreted as the density function of the prior over
Θ.
Another important point of the theorem rests primarily on the existence result
(11). it assures the existence of a random variable that encapsulate the maxi-
mum possible knowledge about the underlying data-generating mechanism that
produces data. we defined in (11) such that any finite subset of {Xi}∞i=1 can be
considered as a random sample of the model
{
θ
∑
xi(1− θ)n−∑ xi}. Another point
usually stressed since the first de Finetti philosophical interpretation is that dFRT
justifies the use of a probability distribution over the parameter Θ = p(X = 1).
The (11) is extremely important. It is in fact a Law of Large Numbers for exchange-
able random variables, a very important result embedded inside the dFRT. Under
exchangeability condition the relative frequency
∑
Xi/n tends to a random vari-
able, not necessarily “degenerate” (i.e. constant with probability one) as in the IID
classical Large Number Law case. Summarizing, the condition of exchangeability
implies:
• There exists a random variable Θ such that:
P(x1, . . . , xn|Θ = θ) = θk(1− θ)n−k;
• Θ is the limit of the relative frequencies: this is the the more general Law of
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Large Numbers for exchangeable random variables and
F (θ) = lim
n→∞
P
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ θ
)
• if F has density, dF (θ) = pi(θ)dθ where pi(θ) is the density of Θ. Before
observing the data, any hypotheses about pi(θ) (right or wrong that it can
be) corresponds to the prior: it is the idea about the underlying structure of
the parameter Θ before the data are collected;
Combining dFRT and Bayes rule, and after some calculus “gymnastic”, it is
possible to show that:
p(xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
θpi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)dθ = E (pi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)) . (14)
This means that, after the posterior is obtained, the best prediction about a
future observation is the expected value of the posterior.
It is clear now how much dFRT is important for the problem of induction.
Before observing the sample {xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn}, there is an idea about the dis-
tribution of Θ that corresponds to an idea about its density pi(θ). This is strictly
related the the underlying data-generating mechanism that describe the struc-
ture of the joint distribution p(xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn). The idea about pi(θ) can be
more or less “close” to the correct, real, distribution of θ, but after observing the
data, something important happens for the possibility of the induction process
(i.e. making probabilistic statements about the future using observation from the
past):
Warning n. 3! Given the exchangeability hypotheses, and whatever is
the observer idea about the prior density pi(θ), the induction about the
probability of the next observation of the event of interest given the data,
will be strongly “guided” by the relative frequency of the observed event
of interest.
In what follows I will motivate it with some examples where I will stress how
the theorem helps to solve the theoretical problem of induction.
3.1 Case I: {Xi}∞i=1 IID.
In this case, since {Xi}ni=1 are IID, by the law of large numbers we have that
over
∑
Xin converges to a degenerate random variable Θ, that is a random vari-
able for winch there exist one value θ such that P (Θ = θ0) = 1 and such that
E(Xi) = θ0. This case is equivalent to say that:
p(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) = θ
k
0(1− θ0)n−k (15)
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Figure 2: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
(
n
x
)
(0.5)n(0.5)n−k for
different values of n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows that
the limit distribution is equal to degenerate case with θ0 = 0.5
.
This is a quit special situation. In general things are more complicated as I
will mention below. In this case Θ does not have a density but, according to
the discussion in (??), we can still manage the integral (12) “as if” it’s density is
represented by aDirac delta function (for a “refresh” of its properties, see appendix
A):
pi(θ) = δ(θ − θ0) (16)
and the corresponding step CDF:
F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
δ(θ − θ0)dθ. (17)
In this case we have:∫ {
θk(1− θ)n−k} δ(θ − θ0)dθ = θk0(1− θ0)n−k, (18)
where the natural choice for approximating θ is
θˆ =
k
n
(19)
3.2 Case II: {Xi}∞i=1 exchangeable but not independent.
A very instructive example due to Bayes himself ([14], p.29). Let’s imagine that
we have a sequence of Bernoulli random variable (X1, X2, . . . ) such that
p
(
n∑
i
Xi = k
)
=
1
n+ 1
, fork = 1 . . . n. (20)
In this case {Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable, they are identically distributed since
p(Xi = 1) =
∫ 1
0
θdF but they are not independent since for example p(X2|X1) 6=
p(X2). dFRT applies, so we can specify the joint probability using (12). Since
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Figure 3: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
1
n+1
for different
values of n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows that the limit
distribution is equal to θ
{Xi}∞i=1 are not IID the dFRT tells us that
∑n
i Xi/n still converges to a random
variable whose “structure” is now more complicated than the degenerate case
saw in the classical IID example above. It can be easily shown analytically that
F (θ) = θ. This is equivalent to say that the prior pi(θ) = 1, i.e θ has a uniform
distribution in (0, 1). Here I will motivate this intuitively with the help of some
software computation. Figure (3.2) shows the distribution function of
∑n
i Xi/n
for our random variables at different values of n. It clearly shows what happen if
n becomes large.
3.3 The general case.
In general the possible structure of p(Sn = k) for the binary case is limited be-
cause of the constrain of the probability properties. The previous cases are only
particular situations and in general it is possible to show that the formula for the
general form of p(Sn = k) is given by:
p(Sn = k) =
(
n
k
)∫ 1
0
θk(1− θ)n−kΓ
(
b
c
)
Γ
(
r
c
)
Γ
(
b
c
+ r
c
) dθ, (21)
where Γ stands for the Gamma function, n is the number of successes over the total
n and and a, b, r, c are suitable parameters. The (21) is called Po´lya urn model. It
follows that:
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ ∼
∫ θ
0
1
B
(
b
c
, r
c
)u bc−1(1− u) rc−1du (22)
3.4 A more “extreme” case
Let’ now consider the situation depicted in (4). GivenXi ∼Bernoulli(θ), such that
p(Xi) = θ and:
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 1) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 0) = 1 (23)
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{Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable and satisfy the dFRT conditions, the relative frequency
can direct successfully the induction process.
4 What if {Xi}∞i=1 are not exchangeable?
Let’s try to summarize the story so far. dFRT is an important theoretical tool since
it can shed light on the meaning and role of the prior in the whole Bayesian cycle.
It shows how the IID case represents just one among many different possibilities
about the distribution over the parameter of interest θ. It is important to stress
that if we are interested in a predictive exercise:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . xn), (24)
even if initial hypotheses about the joint distribution differ, after the data they
tend to “’converge”. Lest consider the following example.
Given Xi, before the data:
• IID assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
25
= 1
1024
• Uniform prior assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2772
given the data: 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0
• IID assumption: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2
• after updating the uniform: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2
This is a well known fact in Statistics: irrespective of the idea about the prior,
different posterior will tend to be close to each other after data are collected. In
particular the expected value of the posterior will be close to the relative frequency and so
it will be the prediction about the probability of the next observation of an event.
So the relative frequency plays an important role but this is true if and only if we
are in presence of exchangeable random variables. If they lack this property, relative
frequency is no longer able to “direct” the induction process. I will show this
with the following example.
Given Xi ∼Bernoulli(θ), such that
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 0) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 1) = 1 (25)
Figure 4: An “extreme” case of exchangeable RV.
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Figure 5: A case of not exchangeable RV.
The evolution with non zero probability are depicted in (5). Xi are not exchange-
able and induction fails since the relative frequency now is not a guide to the esti-
mation of the underlying mechanism that produced the data. Indeed for example
p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1 and not the value suggested using the relative fre-
quency that is 1/2 in this case.
Summarizing: if a sequence of random variable exchangeable, the relative frequency
of data leads to a proper evaluation of the predictive probability. If the random variables
are not exchangeable, the relative frequency will not guide to a proper inferential conclu-
sion. This is the case where the Bayes inferential machinery (4) goes haywire. This
can be synthesize in the following final:
Warning n. 4! If Xi are not exchangeable, the relative frequency is no
longer able to direct the induction process to correct conclusions.
5 The moral of the story
Frequentist and Bayesian inferential inference are usually pictured as irreconcil-
able paradigms in Statistics and the main difference between the two (parame-
ters fixed versus parameters as random variables) often stressed as a the fracture
between the two visions. The de Finetti’s representation theorem is usually intro-
duced in the context of Bayesian inference and it is considered to play a role in the
“justification” of the prior distribution of the parameter of interest. In this expos-
itory work I tried to challenge this view with an understanding of the theorem
that stresses its role at the frontline between Probability Theory and Inferential
Statistics, and its relation to the very problem of relating past observations with
future predictions. To conclude, a list of the main key-points:
• exchangeability is the key property for induction;
• the use of relative frequencies for prediction during the induction process
makes sense only in the presence of exchangeability;
• de Finetti’s theorem clarify the role played by the relative frequency in the
Bayesian framework;
• the IID case is a particular case;
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• for non-exchangeable randomvariables, relative frequencieswill fail to guide
the induction process;
• the theorem can be extended to arbitrary real-valued exchangeable sequences
[6]. Finite version and generalizations can be found in [7]. Further general-
izations in [10].
“This [theorem] is one of the most beautiful and important results in modern
statistics. Beautiful, because it is so general and yet so simple[11]”
Appendix A Dirac delta
It is obvious that probability density is definite only for absolute continuous vari-
ables. However, in some “pathological” situation can be useful to extend the
concept of density. The figure 4 below depicts the posterior shapes (described by
Betas distribution) for different valises of n. The when N increases the base of
the bell-shaped density will be narrower and narrower and the top higher and
higher. For N very big we can imagine that the density will tend to something
with an infinitesimally narrow base whereas the height goes to infinity. The limit
density when N → ∞ is not a “traditional” density but an exotic mathematical
object called a Dirac delta generalized distribution. The Dirac delta - also called gen-
eralized function is usually indicated as δ(θ − θ0) and formally it can be described
as follows:
δ(θ − θ0) =
{
0 θ 6= θ0
∞ θ = θ0 (26)
with the property that ∫
R
δ(x)dx = 1 (27)
The delta function is not a distribution, technically it is not even a mathemat-
ical function. Instead it can make sense to use it inside integrals in operation
involving limits of sequences of normalized (integral= 1) functions behaving like
the Beta in (A). If we have a sequence of such functions δn(x) it holds that:
lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)δn(x− x0)dx = f(x0) (28)
It should be emphasize that the integral on the left-hand side of is not a Rie-
mann integral but a limit. It can be treated as a Stieltjes integral if desired. δ(x)dx
is replaced by dH(x), where dH(x) is the Heaviside step function.
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